Economic models describe individuals by underlying characteristics, such as the degree to which they like music, have sympathy, want success, need recognition, etc. In reality, such characteristics change through experiences: taste for Mozart changes through attending concerts, sympathy through meeting people, etc. Models typically ignore change, partly because it is unclear how to incorporate it. I develop a general axiomatic framework for de…ning, analysing and comparing rival models of change. Seemingly basic postulates on modelling change have strong implications, like irrelevance of the order in which someone has his experiences and 'linearity'of change. This is a step towards placing the modelling of change on axiomatic grounds and enabling non-arbitrary incorporation of change into economic models. JEL Classi…cation Codes: C0, C7, D0, D8.
Introduction
In much of economic modelling practice, nothing about an individual (except perhaps his information state) is taken to change over time. For instance, an individual engaged in a dynamic decision problem or game with stages t = 1; 2; :::; T (T …nite or in…nite) is often assumed to maximise (the expectation of) a discounted sum P T t=1 t u(a t ), in which a t is the period-t outcome (e.g. his period-t consumption bundle, or in the case of a game the period-t action pro…le), is a discount factor, and u(:) is the individual's intra-period utility function which, importantly, does not change (exogenously) with time t or (endogenously) with the outcomes of past periods. Such a preference speci…cation precludes that the individual's period-t ability to enjoy the period's outcome depends on time or past outcomes. Gary Becker (1996) and many others stress the unrealistic nature of such an assumption: in real life, the pleasure derived from listening to classical music, consuming drugs, meeting friends, and so on, depends on time (kids di¤er from adults) and on the past consumption pattern (enjoyment of Bordeaux wine has to be learnt). Sen (1977 Sen ( , 1979 Sen ( , 1985 , Rabin (1998) and many others stress the possibility to have, develop or lose other-regarding feelings that re ‡ect sympathy, hate, reciprocity, identi…cation or other attitudes: in a real-life repeated interaction within a couple, Ann may have changing feelings for Peter (depending on age and past events), where the state of these feelings in a period t determines how much pleasure Ann then receives from an outcome a t that bene…ts Peter. All these scenarios are excluded by de…ning period-t utility invariably as u(a t ). The (equilibrium) behaviour one derives in a decision problem or game would be more realistic if change in agent characteristics were successfully incorporated into agent preference.
I develop a uni…ed axiomatic framework in which to de…ne, analyse and compare rival models of change in a characteristic, such as taste for wine, identi…cation with one's partner, risk aversion, alcohol addiction, need for recognition, impatience as identi…ed with a discounting rate, personal or social capital as in Becker's consumer theory, and so on. More precisely, I model the individual as being at any moment in some state s, a real number that measures the characteristic of interest. The state changes under what I call experiences, where this term is used in its broadest and most ‡exible sense, covering both internal events (e.g. the e¤ect of a drug, coming into puberty, getting Alzheimer) and external events (e.g. the smile of a child, an earthquake), and covering events either under the agent's own control (e.g. his moves in decision problem or game) or not under his control (e.g. moves of others or nature). The framework can be applied in several ways, for instance to study 'non radical'preference change which preserves stable fundamental preferences over fully speci…ed worlds or world histories, 2 or to study fundamental preference change (dynamic inconsistency) by letting these preferences depend on a changing characteristic (e.g. an addiction level), or to study change in preference-unrelated characteristics such as beliefs. The present axiomatic approach responds to the discrepancy between recognized importance of change and lack of theoretical understanding of it.
The axioms on change introduced below have some ‡avour of 'rationality' 2 For instance, in the above example's intertemporal utility P T t=1 t u(at) one could replace each intratemporal utility term u(at) by a term u(at; s) that depends on the agent's current state s (e.g. his taste for wine or feelings for someone), which can in turn be speci…ed as a function of time t and/or of past outcomes a0; :::; at 1.
postulates, though it is clear that principles of rationality alone cannot tell us how exactly someone's feelings or taste for wine will (should?) change in the face of certain experiences. I introduce some postulates, whose combination turns out to severely constrain and discipline change, forcing it to take a simple and convenient form potentially suitable for modelling practice. Speci…cally, the order in which experiences are made is irrelevant to overall change, and (adding further conditions) change is 'linear'. As I shall emphasise at di¤erent points, these …ndings can be interpreted either as providing welcome axiomatic support for modelling change in a simple way, or, by contraposition, as informing us that any change pattern without these simple features (of order-insensitivity or linearity) can only be modelled by violating basic axioms on change.
Mathematically, the key insight is that experiences can be viewed as operators (operating on individual constitutions) that can be composed (representing repeated experiences) and ordered (in terms of strength of experience). This allows me to apply basic theorems of ordered group theory and topological algebra by Hölder (1901) , Huntington (1902) , Arzél (1948) , Tamari (1949) , Alimov (1950) and Nakada (1951) .
While the axiomatic approach to individual change is new, this paper is related, at least in its motivation, to a growing and diverse literature on endogeneity, i.e. on the dependence of human tastes and other characteristics on the environment, institutions, characteristics of others, and so on. This literature has added signi…cantly to our understanding and o¤ers concrete models incorporating endogeneity. See for instance Polak (1976) , Bowles (1998) and Rabin (1998) ; on endogenous other-regarding feelings (such as sympathy, spitefulness, reciprocal feelings), see Rabin (1993) , Fehr and Gächter (1998) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Sethi and Somanathan (2001) and (2003), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , Dietrich (2008) and Maccheroni et al. (forthcoming) ; on endogenously changing fundamental preferences (i.e. dynamic inconsistency), see Strotz (1955-56) , Hammond (1976) , and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) . Two notable approaches to modelling preference change are preference evolution models (e.g., Dekel et al. 2007 ) and the theory of adaptive utility (initiated by Cyert and DeGroot 1975) . Each of these models does of course in its own particular way address change of the endogenous characteristic in question. But these models are not (and were not intended as) full- ‡edged, general 'change models', for a variety of reasons. 3 This paper aims for a full- ‡edged change model. The paper can also be viewed as a response to the non-uni…ed character of our current theory of endogeneity, which indeed appears more as a disjunction of several special theories, each one designed for a particular human characteristic, environment or experimental setup.
Change models
I now de…ne a general notion of 'change model'. The notion is ‡exible: it abstracts from the particular characteristic of interest, so as to be applicable -at least in principle -to (change in) various kinds of characteristics, such as taste for goods, altruism, risk aversion, drug addiction, need for recognition, impatience (discounting rate), or personal or social capital. Formally, a state space is an arbitrary set S, whose members represent the agent's possible states w.r.t. the relevant characteristic. Typically, a state is a number (e.g. a sympathy level or a parameter measuring taste for wine and entering the agent's Cobb-Douglas utility function over consumption bundles); or, it is a vector of numbers (e.g. the entire parameter vector of the individual's Cobb-Douglas utility function). If the state space is a subset of some Euclidean space R n , where it contains more than one state and is compact and convex, then it is called Euclidean, or more precisely n-dimensional. In particular, a one-dimensional state space takes the compact and convex form S = [a; b] R where a < b.
How does the state change? Let us …rst take a simple approach. By a simple change model (for a state space S) I mean a triple (S; E; (:j:)) consisting of: the state space S, an arbitrary set E (of possible experiences), a function (:j:) : S E ! S (the revision rule, which maps each pair of an initial state s and an experience e to the agent's new state sje).
The set E contains all experiences the individual may have. As explained earlier, the term 'experience'is taken in its broadest sense as being any relevant in ‡uence on the individual. The mathematical structure of experiences is entirely general: experiences could be numbers, vectors, functions, elements of a metric space, or whatever the modeller wishes.
Simple change models give us a …rst, base-line approach to representing change. As an important example, Bayesian belief revision is a simple change model: states are probability functions, experiences are observed events, and revision is Bayesian updating. But we mainly focus on preference-rather than belief-related characteristics; there, simple change models are less natural.
But often this approach is 'too simple' to work. When attempting to de…ne the revision rule, one may encounter a severe problem: the new state to which a given experience e leads is underdetermined by the old state s. So, s fails to encode enough information to determine the new state, i.e. to adequately de…ne sje. As an example, suppose states are altruism levels. The agent currently is in a state of high altruism s, but after a 'negative life experience'e acquires a state of low altruism s l ; so, sje = s l . Now suppose alternatively that, before having this experience, the agent has a 'positive life experience' e 0 which con…rms the agent in his high altruism, thus leaving his state unchanged; so, sje 0 = s. Though leaving the state una¤ected, the interim experience has entrenched altruism more deeply in the agent's psychology (a fact that the state fails to capture). As a result, the following 'negative life experience'e has less of an e¤ect on the agent's state s, changing it merely to a state of medium altruism s m ; so, sje = s m . This is an immediate contradiction, since we cannot de…ne sje both as s l and as s m . The lesson is that it may be unclear how to de…ne revision since the e¤ect of an experience on the state may depend on psychological information not contained in that state, such as information about 'state entrenchment'.
In response, I introduce a richer description of the agent than his state, to be called his 'constitution'. It can encode additional information (for instance about 'state entrenchment') which goes beyond the characteristic of interest, e.g. beyond the parameters of the agent's utility function over consumption bundles. Although it is the state, not the entire constitution, which ultimately matters, the constitution will play a key role: revision can now be de…ned on the level of constitutions, and change in state can be explained by change in underlying constitution. Formally, a change model (for a state space S) is a tuple (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) consisting of: the state space S, an arbitrary set E (of possible experiences), an arbitrary set C (of possible constitutions), a surjective function ( :) : C ! S (the state projection, which maps each constitution c to the agent's state c in that constitution), a function (:j:) : C E ! C (the revision rule, which maps each pair of an initial constitution c and an experience e to the agent's new constitution cje), such that two technical conventions to be de…ned shortly (namely (1) and (2)) are respected. The state projection extracts the ultimately relevant information from the agent's constitution. (The surjectivity assumption is there to ensure that S contains no impossible states.) The revision rule (:j:) operates on the level of constitutions, not states. As the agent's constitution changes from c to cje, his state changes from c to cje. A constitution c must indirectly encode not just the current state (namely, c) but also the way the state reacts to future experiences. Does this imply that constitutions must be de…ned as highly complex objects, as complex as a genetic code, and too complex for practical purposes? This question will be of central interest to us (and I hope to bring some positive news). Mathematically, constitutions can be arbitrary objects (e.g. vectors), just as experiences.
This notion of a change model strictly generalizes that of a simple change model. Indeed, a simple change model (S; E; (:j:)) can be viewed as a special change model in which constitutions are identi…ed with states, i.e. in which C := S and c := c for all c 2 C. 4 The need to go beyond simple change models and work with general ones is not just an artifact of a mis-speci…ed notion of 'state', as one might at …rst suspect. One might suspect that as soon as states are speci…ed more richly by including all necessary information, one can de…ne revision satisfactorily at the level of states without invoking a separate notion of 'constitution'. This impression is misguided. Far from allowing us to stick to a simple change model, this strategy of 'enriching states'leads directly to a general change model (albeit under di¤erent terminology). The reason is, …rstly, that such 'informationally enriched states'are simply 'constitutions' in our initial sense, so that S collapses into C. Secondly, since the 'enriched state'contains economically irrelevant information, one needs a function which extracts the relevant information from it; but the extracted information is simply the 'state'in our initial, non-enriched sense, and the function is the state projection ( :). We are thus led back to a change model in our general, not our simple sense.
Change models obviously involve additional theoretical constructs, namely experiences and constitutions, which -like the traditional constructs of subjective probabilities and utilities -are hard or impossible to observe directly. What matters for testability and falsi…ability purposes is that these constructs have observable implications, which they do in may applications.
Notation and de…nitions. I often drop brackets when it is clear how to place them; e.g. cjeje 0 stands for (cje)je 0 , and cje 1 je n stands for ( (cje 1 ) )je n (interpreted as c if n = 0). I call the change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) a submodel of another one (Ŝ;Ê;Ĉ; (b :); (:ĵ:)) (and the latter a supermodel or extension of the former) if S Ŝ , E Ê , C Ĉ , ( :) = (b :)j C and (:j:) = (:ĵ:)
The two conventions. Call experiences e; e 0 essentially identical if they have the same e¤ect on each constitution, i.e. if cje = cje 0 for all constitutions c. By convention, the model describes experiences only as far as relevant: 5 no distinct experiences e; e 0 2 E are essentially identical.
So, if losing a friend on Monday and doing so on Tuesday a¤ect the individual in the same way, the two will be modelled as the same experience e 2 E of 'losing a friend'. Hence, each e 2 E in a sense represents an experience type, which makes it meaningful to experience e repeatedly.
What matters about a constitution c are the present and future states. Accordingly, I call constitutions c; c 0 essentially identical if cje 1 je n = c 0 je 1 je n for all experience sequences (e 1 ; :::; e n ) of any (possibly zero) length n 0 (i.e. if c = c 0 and cje = c 0 je for all experiences e and cje 1 je 2 = c 0 je 1 je 2 for all experiences e 1 ; e 2 , etc.). By convention, the model describes constitutions only as far as we have de…ned a proper change model only if the conventions (1) and (2) are respected.
5 So, experiences may be formally identi…ed with constitution transformations C ! C.
relevant:
no distinct constitutions c; c 0 2 C are essentially identical.
The conventions (1) and (2) impose no loss of generality. 6
3 Examples and applications I now give two formal examples of change models, followed by two concrete applications. (Later in Section 7 I give two further applications which, unlike the present ones, are partly geared to dynamic inconsistency.)
Example 1: the linear model. This is a particularly important change model, later shown to have several salient properties. For a given Euclidean state space S R n (where n 1), the linear change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) is de…ned by:
the set of experiences E = S (0; 1). An experience (s; x) 2 E is written s x , with x interpreted as strength of experience and s as the state to which the individual is attracted. (If states are levels of sympathy for kids, the experience s x of meeting a friendly kid might have high s.) the set of constitutions C = S [0; 1). A constitution (s; x) 2 C is again written s x , with s interpreted as the current state and x as strength of constitution, i.e. immunity to experience. the state projection given by s x = s for all s x 2 C. (So the 's'in a constitution s x stands indeed for the current state.) the revision rule given by s x jsx = x x+x s +x x+xs x+x for all s x 2 C and sx 2 E.
So, having an experiencesx in a constitution s x leads the state to change from s to a weighted average of s ands, with weights being determined by the strengths of the experience and the old constitution. The new constitution has strength x +x. So, the stronger the old constitution and the experience, the stronger the new constitution, and hence, the smaller the e¤ect of future experience (which seems plausible in that future experience must then compete with a higher stock of past in ‡uences). Repeatedly applying the linear revision rule, the e¤ect of an entire sequence of experiences s 1 x 1 ; :::; s t x t (t 0) on a constitution s x is given by
xs + x 1 s 1 + ::: + x t s t x + x 1 + ::: + x t x+x 1 +:::+x t :
Example 2: a non-parametric model. As a more abstract example, consider a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) de…ned by:
6 If the conventions are initially violated, simply identify any essentially identical constitutions and identify any experiences e; e 0 2 E such that cje and cje 0 are essentially identical for all c 2 C.
the set of constitutions C consisting of all …nite measures on (the Borelmeasurable sets of) S with a non-negative density function f : S ! [0; 1). Here, f (s) represents how much the individual currently 'tends'to state s. the set of experiences E consisting of all …nite measures on S with a positive density function f : S ! (0; 1). So, experiences are again measures, this time capturing tendencies in (the e¤ect of) experience. the state projection given by c = M edian(c) for all c 2 C. 7 The agent's state c represents a 'summary' or 'compromise' of all tendencies in his current constitution c. 8 the revision rule given by cje = c + e for all c 2 C and e 2 E.
So, the agent's post-experience constitution is the sum of his old constitution c and the experience e; his state changes from M edian(c) to M edian(c + e).
I now sketch two applications, namely a decision-theoretic one followed by a game-theoretic one.
Application 1: the state as the taste of a Becker-type consumer. Consider an agent in an intertemporal consumption problem with T periods and K goods (K; T 2 f1; 2; :::g). A (consumption) bundle is a vector b = (b 1 ; :::; b K ) 2 [0; 1) K , with b k denoting quantity of good k. A (consumption) path is a tuple (b t ) t=1;:::;T of bundles, with b t denoting the bundle consumed in period t. Following Becker (1996) , taste for many goods (e.g. wine or classical music) depends on past consumption. Accordingly, let the individual's state s be a measure of his taste for goods. If in a period t the agent consumes bundle b with taste (state) s, he receives utility u(b; s) in that period. The analytic form of u(b; s) might belong to one of the classic parametric families (Cobb-Douglas, CES, ...), with s being one of the parameters or a vector of some or all of the parameters. 9 Becker's important insight is that the past consumption pattern b 1 ; :::; b t 1 a¤ects period-t taste s; let us write s = s(b 1 ; :::; b t 1 ) to capture the dependence. But Becker's theory gives no clear answers to our question of how taste changes, i.e. how we should specify s(b 1 ; :::; b t 1 ) as a function of b 1 ; :::; b t 1 . This question matters notably for the intertemporal consumer problem of maximising intertemporal utility
7 By de…nition, the median m = M edian(c) has the property that c(fs 2 S : s mg) = c(fs 2 S : s mg); if more than one m 2 S has this property, M edian(c) is by convention the middle of the interval of all these m's (also other conventions would work). 8 The median is a compromise in that it minimises the average distance to states (relative to the measure). 9 Using the CES utility function, u(b; s) = ((s1b 1 ) + :::
for parameters s1; :::; sK ; > 0. The state s could be s1 (taste for good 1), with the other parameters being …xed, i.e. unchanged. Or, s could be the vector of all parameters, a multi-dimensional state.
over consumption paths (b 1 ; :::; b T ) 2 [0; 1) K T subject to a budget constraint (with > 0 denoting a …xed discounting factor).
If we for example adopt the linear change model, taste changes as follows. Constitutions and experiences are represented by strength-indexed states. Initially, the agent is in some constitution c s x , i.e. his taste is s, entrenched to degree x. The experience of consuming a bundle b is identi…ed with a strength-indexed state: b s b x b ; i.e., taste is attracted to s b with strength x b . Applying the linear revision rule, the new constitution is cjb = 
If, by contrast, we follow Example 2's non-parametric change model (assuming that the state is one-dimensional), then taste changes rather di¤erently, leading to di¤erent optimal consumption paths. The agent's initial constitution is represented by a measure c over S, whose median de…nes the initial taste Application 2: state as the level of sympathy for another player. One often observes cooperative behaviour in repeated interactions with a prisoners'-dilemma-type monetary payo¤ structure. Arguably, such phenomena are often best explained not by postulating irrationality of entirely self-interested agents, and also not by postulating stable levels of sympathy (other-regardingness), but rather by allowing endogenous change in sympathy levels in response to the 'treatment'the player receives by others. Indeed, the level of sympathy for other people plausibly changes with their behaviour. We therefore have to model change in sympathy. As an illustration, consider a dynamic game with two players 1 and 2, perfect information, and stages t = 0; 1; :::; T (1 T < 1). Each stage t consists of a simultaneous move of the players: each player chooses between 'cooperate' (C) and 'defect' (D). A stage-t outcome (B 1 ; B 2 ) 2 fC; Dg 2 leads C D C 2; 2 0; 3 D 3; 0 1; 1 C D C 2 + 2s; 2 + 2s 0 3s; 3 D 3; 3s 0 1 + s; 1 + s 0 
with n t denoting the number of times cooperation C ( s C x C ) occurs among B j 0 ; :::; B j t 1 . Note that we have now fully speci…ed a dynamic game with endogenously changing mutual sympathy. For many reasonable parameter combinations 13 , there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that (along the equilibrium path) both players cooperate at all stages. Interpretationally, a player cooperates in early stages 14 in order to win the sympathy of the other player (although cooperation gives him less current utility, and of course less monetary payo¤), and later players cooperate because they like each other by then (with cooperation now being dominant in the current constituent game). This contrasts with the always-defect prediction in classical …nitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas. 15 1 0 By letting S = [ 1; 1] one could also capture antipathy. 1 1 Whenever I denote a player by i, I denote the other by j. 1 2 Notice two implicit assumptions (that could be dropped).
First, the parameters s C ; x C ; s D ; x D ; s; x are the same for each player. Second, a player's state is not a¤ected by his own actions (which neglects phenomena such as habit-formation). 1 3 Reasonably, s D < s < s C , i.e. a defect-experience reduces sympathy, and a cooperateexperience increases it. Also, the strengths of experience x C ; x D and the number of periods T
should not be too small, to leave su¢ cient potential for state change. 1 4 The number of early stages is zero if initial sympathy c already exceeds 1=2. 1 5 It is worth mentioning psychological (dynamic) games as another fruitful approach for ex-
Two postulates about change and a consequence
In this and the next two sections, we consider a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a one-dimensional state space S. Although all notions and axioms introduced in these sections apply equally to multi-dimensional states, the reader is invited to restrict his or her attention to the one-dimensional case for now; multi-dimensional states are postponed to Section 8.
I now introduce two natural postulates on change -Attraction and Indoctrination -and prove that, on the background of a richness assumption, they imply a striking restriction: switching the order of two experiences has no e¤ect on the state to which the individual is ultimately attracted. For instance, if as in Application 2 the individual is a player and his states are his sympathy levels for the opponent, then experiencing …rst cooperation and then defection by the opponent attracts the player to the same sympathy level as experiencing …rst defection and then cooperation. This conclusion is non-obvious because none of my postulates deals explicitly with the order of experience. The …nding can be interpreted in two ways: either as a welcome argument for ignoring the order of experience when modelling change, a simplicity gain; or as a warning that modelling order-sensitive change behaviour requires giving up at least one of the basic assumptions. 16 I start with the …rst postulate. Real-life experiences usually 'pull'us in some direction, 'suggest'to us to be of some kind: nice behaviour of Sam suggests liking Sam, drinking wine 'pulls'towards higher wine addiction, and so on. I formalise this using the notion of attraction to a state:
De…nition 1 An experience e attracts to a state s if for every constitution c the new state cje is s or is strictly between s and the old state c. An experience is attracting if it attracts to a state. An attracting experience has the (plausible) feature of always moving the plaining the emergence of cooperation and reciprocal behaviour (e.g. Geanakoplos et al. 1989 ). There, a player's sympathy levels (and hence, his utilities) can depend on his beliefs about other players'beliefs, and hence indirectly on his beliefs about the 'kindness'of their intentions.
1 6 The co-existence of two readings -direct or by contraposition -pertains to many results, including Aumann's on agreeing to disagree. Aumann's (1976) celebrated result can be read either as supporting that agents do not 'agree to disagree', or as showing that modelling agents who 'agree to disagree'requires giving up a basic assumption (of common priors or of Bayesian updating).
agent's state towards the same point, regardless of where the agent started. Two facts are worth recording (the proofs are obvious).
For any (initial) constitution c, if an experience e attracts to the old state c, then the state does not change, i.e. cje = c.
Each experience e attracts to at most one state, which (if existent) is denoted e and called the attractor of e or simply the state of e.
The …rst postulate requires experiences to be of the attracting kind:
Attraction (A) Each experience e attracts to a state e.
Attraction. which holds in our Examples 1 and 2 17 , is a plausible, though not universal property of change. It notably allows an experience to attract to the maximal (resp. minimal) state in S, in which case the experiences always raises resp. reduces the individual's state.
The second postulate concerns the e¤ect of repeated experience:
Indoctrination (I) For every experiences e, writing c n for cje je (the result of n times experiencing e), (I 1 ) for any initial constitutions c; c 0 , the di¤erence in …nal state, c n c 0 n , converges to zero as n ! 1 (in short: unboundedly growing future experience ultimately overrules the past); (I 2 ) for any initial constitution c, the e¤ect of any experience e 0 on the …nal state, c n je 0 c n , converges to zero as n ! 1 (in short: unboundedly growing past experience ultimately overrules the future).
Indoctrination (which again holds in Examples 1 and 2 18 ), is another plausible but not universal property. Part of the plausibility lies in the fact that only an asymptotic requirement is made, and that asymptotic negligibility (of the past in I 1 and the future in I 2 ) is required only for the highly extreme and arti…cial circumstances in which the individual has (is 'indoctrinated'by) exactly the same experience e over and over again, without distraction by other experiences in between and without the 100 th experiences being any di¤erent or weaker than the …rst. Intuitively, as total experience grows, the past (in I 1 ) or future (in I 2 ) matters less and less in comparison, and ultimately becomes negligible. This is plausible if we exclude decay: an experience e does not later gradually lose its power, it is not 'forgotten'as time progresses and further (possibly identical) experiences are made. M edian(e) and cnje 0 = M edian(c + ne + c 0 ) ! M edian(e). 1 9 Our framework is mainly aimed at change without decay of the e¤ect of past experiences Notice also that both previous conditions exclude the existence of a 'neutral' experience which leaves all states unchanged.
The composition of two experiences is naturally de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2 An experienceê is the composition of experiences e; e 0 ifê has the same e¤ ect as e followed by e 0 , i.e. if cjê = cjeje 0 for all constitutions c.
An obvious remark follows from (1):
For all experiences e; e 0 , there is (i.e. E contains) at most one composition of e and e 0 ; if there is one, it is denoted e e 0 or simply ee 0 .
My results will assume the set of experiences to be 'closed under composition':
Richness 1 (R 1 ) If E contains experiences e; e 0 , it contains their composition ee 0 .
Richness 1 is satis…ed in many examples. 20 A model violating R 1 can always be enriched to one satisfying R 1 by simply 'closing'E under composition. 21 As shown in the appendix, composition of experience de…nes an associative operation on constitutions (given Richness 1 ), so that one may drop brackets without ambiguity: ee 0 e 00 stands for either e(e 0 e 00 ) or (ee 0 )e 00 , and e n for the n-fold selfcomposition e e (n 1).
Some brief remarks about the role of richness conditions in axiomatics are due. Virtually all formal models in decision theory have their own richness conditions; e.g. Savage's and von-Neumann-Morgenstern's models assume the agent to face a rich set of acts resp. lotteries. 22 This paper uses certain conditions of richness in experiences or constitutions. If in a concrete application the agent cannot 'have'all these experiences or constitutions (because they simply do not occur, are 'infeasible'in the special environment), then our rich model refers to an extension and initial states and constitutions. Accordingly, in Indoctrination, each new occurrence of e is intuitively 'added' to the stock of earlier ones, without 'replacing' or 'diminishing' them. Extending our approach so as to allow for decay is a challenge left for future research and might be accomplished in various ways, some of which involve weakening or dropping Indoctrination. One way (which is compatible with retaining Indoctrination) explicitly augments change models by decay (or 'de-experience') operators, which transform individual constitutions in the opposed direction from experiences: they 'undo'the e¤ect of experience. In group-theoretic terms, they are inverses of experiences relative to composition (see De…nition 2). Change models as currently de…ned do not allow inversion of experiences: (E; ) is just a semi group, as proven later.
2 0 In our Examples 1 and 2, composition is given by sxsx = sx+sx x+x x+x and eẽ = e +ẽ, respectively. 2 1 W.l.o.g., identify experiences in E with transformations C ! C. Extend E to a setÊ by adding all those transformations C ! C that are compositions of (two or more) transformations in E, and extend the revision rule C E ! C to a revision rule C Ê ! C in the obvious way. 2 2 The set of Savage acts (mappings from nature states to outcomes) is closed under mixing and contain all 'constant acts'. Von-Neumann-Morgenstern's agent chooses from the set of all lotteries (over given deterministic outcomes).
of the real environment so as to also include what would happen in hypothetical cases. 23 Theorem 1 If a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a one-dimensional state space S satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination and Richness 1 , then ee 0 = e 0 e for all experiences e; e 0 2 E.
This order-invariance …nding can be illustrated by the models of Examples 1 and 2. In Example 1, s xsx =sxs x = xs+sx x+x for all experiences s x ;sx; and in Example 2, ee 0 = e 0 e = M edian(e + e 0 ) for all experiences e; e 0 . As Theorem 1 shows, the order-invariance property is no coincidence: it holds not just for change models as simple as Examples 1 and 2, but for all change models satisfying Attraction, Indoctrination and Richness 1 . Order-invariance in the full sense would amount to ee 0 = e 0 e rather than just ee 0 = e 0 e for all experiences e; e 0 . Full orderinvariance says not only that the two experiences ee 0 and e 0 e attract to the same attractor state (perhaps di¤erently strongly), but that they are the same -a far stronger conclusion which also implies that they attract the initial constitution equally strongly and indeed that the new constitution is the same both times, so that any next experience e 00 will have the same e¤ect both times, and so on. Full order-invariance is obtained in Theorem 2 below.
To illustrate the proof given in the appendix, consider any experiences e; e 0 . The proof brings to light two intuitive facts about any experience g and its n-fold repetition g n = g g, where n 1. Firstly, g n attracts to the same state as g. Formally, g n = g for all n 1. Secondly, in the composite experience eg n e 0 the e¤ect of the parts e and e 0 vanishes compared to the e¤ect of the part g n as n gets very large, so that asymptotically the experience attracts to the same state as g n , i.e. as g. Formally, eg n e 0 ! g as n ! 1. Applying the second mentioned fact with g := e 0 e, we obtain e(e 0 e) n e 0 ! e 0 e as n ! 1. Now e(e 0 e) n e 0 is the same as (ee 0 ) n+1 by associativity of composition, and hence as ee 0 by the …rst mentioned fact (applied with g := ee 0 ). Thus, ee 0 ! e 0 e as n ! 1, so that (since ee 0 does not depend on n) ee 0 = e 0 e, as desired.
Strength of constitution and strength of experience
The above postulates -Attraction and Indoctrination -might be viewed as de…n-ing the large class of 'prima facie plausible'change models, which includes models as di¤erent as the linear model and Example 2's non-parametric model. Within this class, the linear model deserves our special attention: it is probably the simplest (interesting) model, and it has something very compelling to it in that the individual's post-experience state is a weighted average of where he was before and where the experience wants him to be. But what exactly (if anything) makes the linear model so special among the class of 'prima facie plausible'change models? It is a single additional property, Attraction-Consistency, as proven in the next section. In the present section, I introduce Attraction-Consistency and prove two consequences of this condition (in conjunction with the previous postulates), namely in Theorem 2 that experience is fully commutative, and in Theorem 3 that, in short, the modeller is allowed to represent experiences and also constitutions as state-strength pairs s x (s; x), just as done in the linear model. Theorems 2 and 3 can again be interpreted in either normative or purely logical terms. 24 The just-announced third condition on change states as follows.
Attraction-Consistency (AC). This condition has two parts.
(AC 1 ) For all experiences e; e 0 attracting to a same state s, if some constitution c is more attracted by e than by e 0 (i.e. the state cje is strictly between s and cje 0 or cje = s 6 = cje 0 ) then each constitution c with s 6 = cje 0 is so.
(AC 2 ) For all constitutions c; c 0 with the same state, if some experience e attracting to a state s attracts c more than c 0 (i.e. the state cje is strictly between s and c 0 je or cje = s 6 = c 0 je) then each experience e attracting to a state s 6 = c 0 je does so.
Condition AC is, more than A and I, a genuine restriction of generality (and a cornerstone on the way towards linearity of chance, as will turn out later). While satis…ed by the linear model, AC fails for Example 2's non-parametric model. AC 1 states that any two experiences e; e 0 which attract to the same state can be unambiguously compared in terms of their strength, in the sense that if e is stronger than e 0 'sometimes'(i.e., in the e¤ect on 'some'constitution), then e is stronger 'always'. If for instance states are levels of altruism and e and e 0 both attract towards a given state of high altruism, then it cannot be that e raises altruism more strongly than e 0 whenever the agent starts at low altruism, while e 0 raises altruism more strongly than e whenever the agent starts at medium altruism. Similarly, AC 2 states that any two constitutions c; c 0 with same state can be unambiguously compared in terms of their strength, in the sense that if c 0 is stronger than c 'sometimes'(i.e., resists better to 'some'experience), then c 0 is stronger 'always'. The section's theorems require a second richness condition. I call a constitution c w weak if every attracting experience e fully attracts c w , i.e. c w je = e. Intuitively, the agent in a weak constitution does not resist at all to any experience, obviously a limiting type of constitution. In Example 1, the weak constitutions are the zerostrength constitutions s 0 (s 2 S). In Example 2, the only weak constitution is the zero-measure on S.
Richness 2 (R 2 ) For every non-weak constitution c there is a weak constitution c w from which c is reachable, i.e. such that c = c w je 1 je n for some experiences e 1 ; :::; e n (n 1).
This condition (which holds in Examples 1 and 2) is fairly plausible. Indeed, if someone starts in a weak constitution (provided there is at least one) it should intuitively be possible for him to reach any non-weak constitution through appropriate experiences -because weakness of constitution stands for the absence of any predispositions whatsoever, hence for the ability to be entirely shaped by experience. (This intuition is underscored by later lemmas.)
The conjunction of R 1 and R 2 is called Richness 1,2 (in symbols: R 1,2 ), and later notation should be interpreted similarly (e.g. Richness 1-3 stands for the conjunction of three richness conditions).
Theorem 2 If a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a one-dimensional state space S satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1,2 , then ee 0 = e 0 e for all experiences e; e 0 2 E.
Note the progress over Theorem 1: while Theorem 1 merely obtained that the order of experience is irrelevant for the ultimate point of attraction ('ee 0 = e 0 e'), Theorem 2 obtains full order-irrelevance ('ee 0 = e 0 e'), so that, intuitively speaking, the order is also irrelevant for the strength of this attraction. In algebraic terminology, (E; ) is an Abelian (i.e. commutative) semigroup. The proof is quite technical and does not lend itself to a short description. Nonetheless, the following observation might give the reader an intuition. What does it mean for the compound experiences ee 0 and e 0 e to be identical. Intuitively, being identical amounts to two properties: …rstly, the two experiences pull the agent towards the same state (i.e., ee 0 = e 0 e), and secondly, they do so equally strongly. The …rst of these properties is already obtained in Theorem 1, without yet assuming AC. The second property draws on the notion of strength of experience, a notion which is made unambiguous by introducing AC (whereas without AC the notion can be ambiguous; see fn. 2).
To state the next theorem (on the structure of experiences and constitutions), I now formally de…ne strength comparisons:
De…nition 3 For every state s, let C s be the set of constitutions with state s and E s the set of experiences attracting to state s, and de…ne the (a) strength relation on E s by: e e 0 ("e is at least as strong as e 0 ") if e attracts constitutions as least as much as e 0 , i.e. for every constitution c, cje is weakly between s and cje 0 ; (b) strength relation on C s by: c c 0 ("c is at least as strong as c 0 ") if c is at most as attracted by experiences as c 0 , i.e. for every attracting experience e, c 0 je is weakly between e and cje.
The linear model, for instance, has E s = fs x : x > 0g and C s = fs x : x 0g, with strength relation on E s (resp. C s ) simply given by s x sx , x x, which is in line with our earlier interpretation of the 'x'in s x as measuring strength of experience (resp. constitution).
The strength relation (on E s resp. C s ) induces a '(strictly) stronger than'relation > and an 'as strong as'relation (on E s resp. C s ), both de…ned as usual. 25 Endowing E s and C s with their strength relations yields ordinal structures (E s ; ) and (C s ; ). Further endowing E s with composition (under R 1 ) yields a structure (E s ; ; ) (a so-called ordered semi-group, as we will see). Isomorphisms between structures (i.e. between sets endowed with relation(s) and/or operation(s)) are de…ned as usual, namely as relation-and operation-preserving bijections. Two structures (A; :::) and (B; :::) are isomorphic (written (A; :::) (B; :::)) if there exists an isomorphism between them. Isomorphic structures are thus identical up to relabelling.
We are now ready for the section's second result. I call a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) trivial if its revision rule is constant, i.e. if the individual is changed to the same constitution c = cje whatever the initial constitution c and experience e. It follows by (1) that there is at most one experience, i.e. that #E 1, and by (2) that constitutions are isomorphic to states, i.e. that one may assume w.l.o.g. that C = S and c = c for all c 2 C.
Theorem 3 If a non-trivial change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a one-dimensional state space S satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1,2 , then for every state s 2 S there exists a set X s (0; 1) (of 'strength levels') closed under addition such that (E s ; ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ; +), and (C s ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ) (hence, to (E s ; )) if C s contains no weak constitution, and to (X s [ f0g; ) if C s contains a weak constitution.
The set of strength levels X s (for a state s) might for instance be (0; 1) (as in the linear model) or [1; 1) or (0; 1)\Q or f1; 2; :::g or fmx+ny : m; n 2 f1; 2; :::gg (for …xed x; y > 0). In fact, for every non-empty set X (0; 1) closed under addition, a submodel of the linear model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) is obtained by replacing E and C by their subsets S X resp. S (X [ f0g) and restricting ( :) and (:j:) accordingly. Applying Theorem 3 to this submodel, the set X s can be identi…ed with X for all s 2 S. In other examples, the set X s varies across states s. Under Theorem 3's conditions, it is justi…ed to represent experiences and also constitutions as state-strength pairs s x (s; x), with state projection given by s x = s, strength comparisons (between experiences or between constitutions) given by s x s x 0 , x x 0 , and composition of experiences given by s x s x 0 = s x+x 0 . This brings us partially to the linear model. Theorem 4 will bring us there fully, by forcing all sets X s to be (0; 1) and the revision rule to be linear.
The proof of Theorem 3 in the appendix begins by establishing that the algebraic structure (E s ; ; ) (for s 2 S) is an ordered semigroup which satis…es several salient properties, such as the properties of being Archimedean, commutative and cancellative. Applying Hölder's (1901) seminal representation theorem, we can then embed (E s ; ; ) into the ordered semigroup of positive reals, ((0; 1); ; +). This proves part (a), and after some arguments also part (b).
Characterisation of the linear change model
As mentioned, the linear model deserves our special attention as it is the perhaps simplest and intuitively most natural (non-degenerate) change model. Does it have a compelling characterisation in terms of few easily interpretable properties? I now show that the linear model is, up to isomorphism, the only change model that satis…es our earlier conditions and is 'su¢ ciently rich' in experiences and constitutions (in the sense of …ve richness conditions). Formally, a change model (Ŝ;Ê;Ĉ; (b :); (:ĵ:)) is isomorphic to (or a reparametrisation of ) another one (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) if there exist an increasing bijection between states S !Ŝ; s 7 ! s , a bijection between constitutions C !Ĉ;c 7 ! c , and a bijection between experiences E !Ê; e 7 ! e , such that (b :) is the image of ( :) (i.e. c = b c for all c 2 C) and (:ĵ:) is the image of (:j:) (i.e. (cje) = c ĵ e for all c 2 C and all e 2 E). 26 Isomorphic models are perfectly equivalent (but perhaps not equally natural or convenient). 27 Here are the …rst two additional richness conditions characteristic of linear models:
Richness 3 (R 3 ) For each constitution c, some experience e leaves the state unchanged, i.e. cje = c. Intuitively, R 3 requires the set of experiences to be rich enough that any state is con…rmed by at least one experience. 28 To illustrate R 4 using the linear model, note that for each non-weak constitution s x (x 6 = 0) we may consider the weaker constitution s 1 2 x . In general, R 4 requires the set of constitutions to be su¢ ciently rich that for any non-weak constitution c there is another non-weak constitution with the same state which is not stronger than c, i.e., either weaker than c or as strong as c or non-comparable with c in terms of the strength relation. If the strength relation over all constitutions with the given state is a linear order (which it is under A, I, AC and R 1,2 by Lemma 11), then the last two possibilities of equal strength and non-comparability disappear, so that R 4 can be characterized more straightforwardly as requiring that for any non-weak constitution c there is a weaker non-weak constitution. So, if for instance states are altruism levels, then for any (non-weak) constitution with low altruism the agent can be in a (nonweak) constitution with the same low altruism but less resistance to experience.
To state the last richness condition, I de…ne a state path as a family (s e ) e2[ 1 n=0 E n (2 S [ 1 n=0 E n ) of states s e 2 S assigned to experience sequences e (e 1 ; :::; e n ) 2 E n of any (possibly zero) length n. A state path (s e ) e2[ 1 n=0 E n describes where the individual is initially (namely in state s () ), after any experience e (namely in state s (e) ), after any pair of experiences e 1 ; e 2 (namely in state s (e 1 ;e 2 ) ), and so on. To each constitution c is naturally assigned state path (cje 1 je n ) (e 1 ;:::;en)2[ 1 n=0 E n , containing the initial state c, the states cje after any experiences e, and so on. 29 Of course, a state path in S [ 1 n=0 E n need not be possible, i.e. need not pertain to any constitution in C. A state path is constant if its states are all the same, i.e. if the agent 'never changes'.
Richness 5 (R 5 ) For any sequence of constitutions (c k ) k=1;2;::: , if the sequence of corresponding state paths converges (pointwise) to a non-constant state path, then there is a constitution c with this state path.
Intuitively, R 5 requires C to be closed under taking 'limiting constitutions'. In R 5 , the constitution c is indeed the limit of the sequence (c k ) k=1;2;::: in the sense of a natural topology. 30 Another perspective on R 5 is that it requires topological closedness (in fact, slightly less than closedness due to the quali…cation 'nonconstant') of the set of constitutions C as embedded into the state path space 2 8 Theorem 4 still holds if we weaken R3 by restricting it to ('extreme') constitutions c whose state c belongs to the boundary of S -a mild richness condition, it seems.
2 9 In fact, a constitution is fully characterized by its state path (by (1)). Formally speaking, we could thus identify constitutions with their state paths. 3 0 Here, I endow C with the weak topology induced by the functions fe : C ! S (with e (e1; :::; en) ranging over [
jen. This topology is by de…nition the smallest (coarsest) topology for which these functions are continuous. So, a constitution sequence (cn) converges to a constitution c if and only if fe(cn) ! fe(c) for all functions fe, or equivalently, if and only if cn's state path converges (pointwise) to c's state path as n ! 1.
We are ready for the characterization result.
Theorem 4 A change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a one-dimensional state space S is the linear model (up to isomorphism) if and only if it satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1-5 .
The proof of this theorem in the appendix again begins by analysing the structure (E s ; ; ), i.e. the set of experiences attracting to a given state s endowed with the strength relation and the composition operation. Using Theorem 4's assumptions, this structure turns out to be an ordered semigroup with the properties of density and completeness and the property of continuity of the operation , where these three properties are understood in the topological (rather than ordinal) sense and refer to the so-called order topology induced by . We can then apply an important representation theorem by Arzél (1948) and Tamari (1949) , which, after additional arguments, tells us that (E s ; ; ) is isomorphic to the ordered semi-group of positive reals, ((0; 1); ; +) (rather than being merely embeddable into ((0; 1); ; +), the property obtained in Theorem 3 under weaker richness assumptions). Similarly, the structure (C s ; ), i.e. the set of constitutions with state s endowed with the strength relation, turns out to be isomorphic to ([0; 1); ). These …ndings take us 'half way'towards a linear change model. The other half of the proof analyses (among other things) composition as an operation on E (rather than on some E s ); this operation is shown to be isomorphic to composition in the linear model. More details of the proof strategy are given in the appendix.
Two further applications
The following two applications serve a twofold goal. First, they illustrate how change models can help to capture changes in fundamental preferences ('dynamic inconsistency'), as opposed to the less radical kinds of changes already illustrated in Applications 1 and 2 above. Second, they are typical examples in which the characteristic in question can easily be multi-dimensional -a scenario formally analysed in the next section.
Application 3: asymmetric information about instable players. There are many interesting dynamic games in which some players -call them instable players -have a characteristic that (i) changes in the course of the game and (ii) is 3 1 This embedding relies on identifying constitutions with their state paths (a one-to-one mapping by (2)). 'Closedness' is meant relative to the pointwise-convergence topology on S preference-relevant in that the states of the characteristic at some point(s) of time a¤ect the utility of the player or perhaps of another player. Players with changing sympathy levels (Application 2) are just one example. Another example are dynamically inconsistent players whose preference over outcomes depends on the decision node. It is often realistic to assume that there is incomplete information about (i) an instable player's initial constitution (how much wine-addiction does he initially have? how much sympathy?), and/or (ii) the e¤ect of the player's moves on his constitution (how does his winedrinking a¤ect his wine-addiction?) or the e¤ect of other players'or nature's moves on his constitution (how does cooperation of other players a¤ect his sympathy level?).
More formally, using the linear change model (in which constitutions and experiences are represented by strength-indexed states), there may be incomplete information about (i) an instable player's initial constitution c s x and/or (ii) the precise experiences s A x A certain moves A in the game give him. Note that not just the other players may be incompletely informed about a given instable player, but also (or only) the player himself: sometimes we are the worst judges of ourselves. The relevance of such games is obvious.
Application 4: explaining dynamic inconsistency by change in characteristics. As mentioned, dynamic inconsistency is change in fundamental preference, i.e. preference over maximally described outcomes (as opposed to Applications 1 and 2, to Becker's theory, and to information-driven preference change 32 ). Models of dynamically inconsistent agents often su¤er from empirical underdetermination and an abundance of free parameters. In response, a change model could be used to constrain ('discipline') preference change. To see how, denote by A the set of relevant alternatives (e.g. terminal histories of a decision tree or dynamic game form) and represent the individual as holding at any moment (e.g. any decision node) a preference relation s on A that is fully determined by the current state s 2 S of some given characteristic (such as drug addiction, criminal energy, health, or altruism). This explains change in preference by change in that characteristic, which (using a change model) is in turn explained by experiences e 2 E such as drug consumption, (un)friendly actions of others, or internal experiences like Alzheimer or puberty. As in Applications 1-3, the question is once again: which change model should be used?
Change in multi-dimensional characteristics
While our previous axiomatic treatment (Sections 4-6) has focused on one-dimensional states, this section turns to a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for a Euclidean state space S R n of an arbitrary dimensionality n 1. The dimensions could for instance represent taste for di¤erent goods. As it turns out, the entire previous analysis -the de…nitions, axioms and theorems -extend without modi…cations or complications, once we appropriately clarify the meaning that our de…nition of 'attracting'takes on in the now n-dimensional context. Recall that an experience e is said to attract towards a state s (= e) if for each initial constitution c the new state cje is s or is strictly between s and the old state c. What means being (weakly or strictly) 'between' two states s and s 0 in the n-dimensional case? It naturally means belonging to the straight line joining s and s 0 (with or without the endpoints, respectively). 33 With this clari…cation in mind, all axioms are well-de…ned, and literal n-dimensional generalizations of Theorems 1-4 hold, as stated in a moment. From an interpretational perspective, however, the requirement that experiences are 'attracting'(i.e., the axiom Attraction) seems far more demanding in the multi-dimensional case n > 1 than in the one-dimensional case. For an experience e to attract a constitution c to the state e, the state must move towards e along the line segment joining the old state c and e; so, the state is attracted proportionally in each dimension (Figure 2, Figure 2: Our strong notion of 'attracting'(left) and a weaker notion (right) for a two-dimensional state space periences attract more strongly in one dimension than in another, or even only in one dimension (Figure 1, right) . If the …rst dimension represents taste for Bach music and the second taste for bananas (where n = 2), then the experience of a Bach concert might a¤ect the state only in the …rst dimension. Our …rst axiom (Attraction) rules out such experiences.
The n-dimensional generalizations of Theorems 1-4 state as follows:
Theorem 1* If a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for an n-dimensional state space S ( n 1) satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination and Richness 1 , then ee 0 = e 0 e for all experiences e; e 0 2 E.
Theorem 2* If a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for an n-dimensional state space S ( n 1) satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1,2 , then ee 0 = e 0 e for all experiences e; e 0 2 E.
Theorem 3* If a non-trivial change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for an n-dimensional state space S ( n 1) satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1,2 , then for every state s 2 S there exists a set X s (0; 1) (of 'strength levels') closed under addition such that (E s ; ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ; +), and (C s ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ) (hence, to (E s ; )) if C s contains no weak constitution, and to (X s [ f0g; ) if C s contains a weak constitution.
Theorem 4* A change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) for an n-dimensional state space S ( n 1) is the linear model (up to isomorphism) if and only if it satis…es Attraction, Indoctrination, Attraction-Consistency and Richness 1-5 .
As already indicated, if n > 1 then this axiomatic analysis of change is limited to rather special experiences, due to the demanding nature of the axiom of Attraction if n > 1. A more general treatment of multi-dimensional change goes beyond the scope of this paper. It would presumably have to weaken the notion of 'attracting'by allowing for di¤erent degrees of attraction along di¤erent dimensions. One might conjecture that, once our axiomatic analysis is appropriately generalized and based on a weaker notion of 'attracting', analogues of our four theorems can be obtained. 34 Interestingly, if n > 1 then in Theorem 4* the isomorphism to the linear model holds in a particularly strong sense: the change model can be 'linearized'without transforming the state. 35 This additional structural property distinguishes the multi-dimensional case n > 1 from the one-dimensional case n = 1; it arises as a complex consequence of the 'interplay of dimensions'.
Theorems 1*-4* can be derived as corollaries of Theorems 1-4. The key insight needed to apply the 'one-dimensional' theorems to the n-dimensional case is as follows. Consider an n-dimensional state space S and a change model M := (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) satisfying Attraction. M induces a sub-model M T for every convex (sub-) state space T S. This sub-model, denoted M T , is de…ned by 3 4 I conjecture that the order-invariance results of the …rst two theorems are still obtainable.
As for the third theorem, I conjecture that the 'strength levels' of experiences or constitutions have to be de…ned as n-dimensional vectors rather than single numbers, since an experience or constitution can be di¤erently strong in di¤erent dimensions. Similarly, I conjecture that the fourth theorem has an analogue involving a generalization of the linear model in which strength of experience or constitution is now n-dimensional. 3 5 Formally, the state transformation s 7 ! b s can be chosen to be the identity function.
restricting the original model to T : the state space is of course T , the set of experiences is E T = fe 2 E : e 2 T g, the set of constitutions is C T = fc 2 C : c 2 T g, the state projection is that of M now restricted to C T , and the revision rule is that of M now restricted to C T E T . If T is chosen to be a line segment T = [a; b] = f a + (1 )b : 2 [0; 1]g (for distinct states a; b 2 S), then it is essentially one-dimensional. 36 So the sub-model M [a;b] falls into the scope of Theorems 1-4, since these theorems of course also hold for essentially rather than properly one-dimensional state spaces. One can prove Theorems 1*-4* by applying Theorems 1-4 'locally', i.e. to appropriately chosen sub-models M [a;b] (a; b 2 S, a 6 = b). More details are given in the appendix.
Conclusion
I have developed a systematic approach to modelling change in an agent's characteristics, as a step towards …lling the wide gap between recognised importance of change and lack of theoretical understanding of it. The …ndings can be applied in many ways:
The decision-or game-theorist might model either 'orthodox'change which keeps fundamental preferences …xed (see Applications 1, 2 and 3), or 'unorthodox'change which induces dynamic inconsistency (see Applications 3 and 4). He might either take our theorems as reasons for neglecting the order of experience (Theorems 1 and 2) and perhaps modelling change linearly (Theorems 3 and 4), or he might insist on order-relevance and non-linearity, which forces him to abandon Attraction, Indoctrination or Attraction-Consistency. The empirical researcher might estimate the real-life value of parameters of a given change model, such as the strength of the experience of cooperation by other people (players).
There is plenty of room for follow-up work: one could study other conditions on change models, generalize our initial treatment of multi-dimensional states (in order to better understand simultaneous change in interrelated characteristics like feelings for one's partner and pleasure at work), introduce the possibility of decay in the long-term e¤ect of experiences and initial constitutions, study various dynamic games with change in individual characteristics, and so on. A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 rests on some preparatory lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose R 1 . Composition is an associative operation on E (hence (E; ) is a semigroup).
Proof. Assume R 1 . Let e; e 0 ; e 00 2 E. By (1) I have to show for all c 2 C that cje(e 0 e 00 ) = cj(ee 0 )e 00 , which holds because, applying the de…nition of composition and R 1 repeatedly, cje(e 0 e 00 ) = cjeje 0 e 00 = cjeje 0 je 00 and cj(ee 0 )e 00 = cjee 0 je 00 = cjeje 0 je 00 .
Lemma 2 Assume A and R 1 . For all experiences e; e 0 , their composition's attractor ee 0 is weakly between e and e 0 , and ee 0 6 = e if e 6 = e 0 .
As an example for Lemma 2, if states are levels of risk-aversion, experience e attracts to high risk-aversion, and experience e 0 to low one, then the composition ee 0 attracts to some intermediate risk-aversion.
Proof. Assume A and R 1 , and let e; e 0 2 E. Consider three cases.
1. First suppose e = e 0 . Take a c 2 C with this state. Applying twice A and then R 1 , c = cje = cjeje 0 = cjee 0 . So c = cjee 0 . Hence ee 0 = c by A, i.e. ee 0 = e = e 0 , as desired.
2. Now suppose e < e 0 . Take c 2 C with state c = ee 0 . I have to show that c 2 (e; e 0 ], and do so in two claims. Claim 1. c e 0 . For a contradiction, let c > e 0 . Then cje < c (by A), and hence cjeje 0 < c (by A and as e 0 ; cje < c). But cjeje 0 = cjee 0 = c (by R 1 and then A), a contradiction. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. c > e. Suppose for a contradiction that c e. Then either c = e or c < e. In the …rst case, cje = c, and so (by c < e 0 and A) cjeje 0 > c. In the second case, cje > c and so (by e 0 > c and A) cjeje 0 > c. So in either case cjeje 0 > c. But cjeje 0 = cjee 0 = c (by R 1 and then A), a contradiction. Q.e.d.
3. Finally, if e 0 < e, the proof that ee 0 2 [e 0 ; e) is analogous to the proof under 2.
Lemma 3 Assume A and R 1 . For all constitutions c and experiences e; e 0 , (a) cje n ! e as n ! 1 if I 1 holds; (b) cje n e 0 ! e as n ! 1 if I holds.
Proof. Assume A and R 1 and consider e; e 0 2 E and c 2 C.
(a) Assume I 1 . Consider any constitution c 0 2 C with state c 0 = e. Since by I 1 cje n c 0 je n ! 0 as n ! 1, where by A each c 0 je n equals e, we have cje n ! e as n ! 1.
(b) Assume I. Let e; e 0 2 E and c 2 C. Since by I 2 cje n e 0 cje n ! 0 as n ! 1, where by part (a) cje n ! e, we have cje n e 0 ! e as n ! 1.
Lemma 4 Assume A and R 1 . For all experiences e; e 0 ; e 00 , (a) e 0 e n ! e as n ! 1 if I 1 holds; (b) e n e 0 ! e as n ! 1 if I holds; (c) e 0 e n e 00 ! e as n ! 1 if I holds.
Proof. Suppose A and R 1 and let e; e 0 ; e 00 2 E.
(a) Assume I 1 . If e = e 0 then by Lemma 2 e 0 e n = e ! e as n ! 1. Now let e 0 < e (the case e 0 > e is analogous). By Lemma 2 (and a simple induction on n) e 0 e n+1 2 [e 0 e n ; e] for all n 0 (where e 0 e 0 stands for e 0 ). So the sequence (e 0 e n ) n 0 is weakly increasing and upper bounded by e. Hence e 0 e n ! s for some s e. As S is topologically closed, s is in S, i.e. is a state. For a contradiction, assume s < e. Let c be any constitution with state c = s. We have cje 0 e n = cje 0 je n ! e by part (a) of Lemma 3. So there is an n 0 such that cje 0 e n > c. However, cje 0 e n c by e 0 e n c and A, a contradiction.
(b) Assume I. The case that e = e 0 can be treated like in part (a). Now let e 0 < e (the case e 0 > e is analogous). Like in (a), it can be seen that (e n e 0 ) n 0 is a weakly increasing sequence converging to some state s. For a contradiction, assume s < e. Letting c be a constitution of state c = s, we have cje n e 0 ! e by part (b) of Lemma 3. So there is an n 0 such that cje n e 0 > c (= s). But cje n e 0 c by e n e 0 c and A, a contradiction.
(c) Assume I. It su¢ ces to show that (i) e 0 e 2n e 00 ! e as n ! 1 and (ii) e 0 e 2n+1 e 00 ! e as n ! 1. I only show (i), as (ii) follows from (i) by replacing e 00 by ee 00 . By Lemma 2, for all n the state e 0 e 2n e 00 = (e 0 e n )(e n e 00 ) is weakly between e 0 e n and e n e 00 . Hence, as by parts (a) and (b) e 0 e n and e n e 00 both converge to e, so does e 0 e 2n e 00 .
As most work is contained in the above lemmas, Theorem 1 now follows easily.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume A, I and R 1 , and let e; e 0 2 E. For all n 2 f1; 2; :::g, Lemma 1 gives the equation (ee 0 ) n+1 = e(e 0 e) n e 0 , whose left resp. right hand side converges to ee 0 resp. e 0 e as n ! 1 by Lemma 4. So, ee 0 = e 0 e.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Some lemmas must …rst be established. Proof. Assume R 1 .
(a) Consider constitutions c; c 0 such that c = c 0 and cj: = c 0 j:. By (2) and as c = c 0 , we have c = c 0 if, for all e 1 ; :::; e k 2 E (k 1), cje 1 je k = c 0 je 1 je k . By R 1 , the latter is equivalent to cje 1 e k = c 0 je 1 e k , which holds by cj: = c 0 j:.
(b) Consider experiences e; e 0 such that cje = cje 0 and cjeẽ = cje 0 e for all constitutions c and experiencesẽ. Then, using R 1 , cjejẽ = cje 0 jẽ for all constitutions c and experiencesẽ. So, by part (a) applied to the constitutions cje and cje 0 , we have cje = cje 0 for all constitutions c. This implies e = e 0 by (1).
Lemma 6 Assume A, I and R 1 . If experiences e; e 0 attract to di¤ erent states, their composition's attractor ee 0 is strictly between the attractors e and e 0 .
Proof. Assume A, I and R 1 , and let e; e 0 2 E have distinct state. By Lemma 2, ee 0 is weakly between e and e 0 . Also by Lemma 2, ee 0 6 = e and e 0 e 6 = e 0 , the latter implying ee 0 6 = e 0 by Theorem 1. So ee 0 is strictly between e and e 0 .
We now prove that something somewhat stronger than R 2 holds if we combine R 2 with R 1 : all constitutions c are reachable from the same weak constitution c w , and this through a single experience. Formally:
Lemma 7 Assume R 1,2 . For every non-weak constitution c there is an experience e c such that c = c w je c for all weak constitutions c w .
Proof. Assume R 1,2 . Let c be a non-weak constitution. By R 2 , c = c w je 1 j je n for some weak constitution c w and experiences e 1 ; :::; e n . So, by R 1 , c = c w je c where e c := e 1 e n . Now let c 0 w be an arbitrary weak constitution. I have to show that c = c 0 w je c , i.e. that c w je c = c 0 w je c . By Lemma 5, it su¢ ces to show that (i) c w je c = c 0 w je c and (ii) c w je c je = c 0 w je c je for all experiences e. Equality (i) holds as it reduces to e c = e c by the weakness of c w and c 0 w . The equality in (ii) holds as it reduces to c w je c e = c 0 w je c e by R 1 , hence to e c e = e c e by the weakness of c w and c 0 w .
Lemma 8 Assume A, I and R 1,2 . Experiences e 1 ; e 2 are identical if ee 1 = ee 2 for all experiences e.
Proof. Assume A, I and R 1,2 . Let e 1 ; e 2 2 E satisfy ee 1 = ee 2 for all e 2 E. By part (b) of Lemma 5, it su¢ ces to show the following two claims. Claim 1. cje 1 = cje 2 for all constitutions c. Let c 2 C. Write c as c = c w je according to Lemma 7. Using …rst R 1 and then the weakness of c w , we have cje 1 = c w jee 1 = ee 1 , and similarly cje 2 = c w jee 2 = ee 2 . So I have to show that ee 1 = ee 2 , which holds by assumption on e 1 ; e 2 . Q.e.d.
Claim 2. cje 1ẽ = cje 2ẽ for all constitutions c and experiencesẽ. Let c 2 C and e 2 E. Again write c as c = c w je according to Lemma 4. Applying …rst R 1 , then the weakness of c w , and then Theorem 1, we have cje 1ẽ = c w jee 1ẽ = ee 1ẽ =ẽee 1 ; and similarly, cje 2ẽ = c w jee 2ẽ = ee 2ẽ =ẽee 2 . So I have to show thatẽee 1 =ẽee 2 , which holds by assumption on e 1 ; e 2 .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 , and let e; e 0 2 E. By Lemma 8 it su¢ ces to showêee 0 =êe 0 e for allê 2 E. Letê 2 E. Consider three exhaustive cases.
Case 1 :ê = e = e 0 . Write s for this state. Applying Lemma 2 repeatedly, we have s =êe =êee 0 , and similarly s =êe 0 =êe 0 e. Soêee 0 =êe 0 e.
Case 2 : e 6 = e 0 . Then e 0 6 = ee 0 by Lemma 6. So ee 0 6 = e 0 ee 0 , again by Lemma 6. Moreover, e 0 ee 0 = e 0 e 0 e by Theorem 1. So, letting c w be any weak constitution (it exists by R 2 ), we have c w je 0 ee 0 = c w je 0 e 0 e by the weakness of c w , and hence by R 1 cjee 0 = cje 0 e where c := c w je 0 . By Theorem 1, ee 0 = e 0 e. In summary, I have shown that ee 0 and e 0 e have a same state -call it s -and that cjee 0 = cje 0 e 6 = s. So, by AC, c 0 jee 0 = c 0 je 0 e for all c 0 2 C. Applying this to c 0 = c w jê, I obtain c w jêjee 0 = c w jêje 0 e, hence by R 1 c w jêee 0 = c w jêe 0 e, and so by the weakness of c ŵ eee 0 =êe 0 e. Case 3 : e 0 6 =ê. This case reduces to case 2 as by Theorem 1êee 0 = ee 0ê and ee 0 e = eêe 0 .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, I analyse the structure (E s ; ; ) (for s 2 S) using Hölder's (1901) seminal theorem, which states as follows. Recall that a (totally) ordered semigroup is a set X endowed with a linear order and an associative binary operation under which is stable (i.e. such that, for all x; y; z 2 X, if x y then x z y z and z x z y). An ordered semigroup (X; ; ) is a (totally) ordered group if (X; ) is a group, commutative if is commutative, cancellative if is cancellative (i.e. from xz = yz or zx = zy follows x = y, for all x; y; z 2 X), and semi-divisible if, for all x; y 2 X with x > y, y divides x (i.e. x = ya = by for some a; b 2 X). An element x of the ordered semigroup is an identity if xy = y for all y (X contains at most one identity), weakly positive (weakly negative) if xy; yx ( )y for all y 2 X, and strictly positive (strictly negative) if it is weakly positive (weakly negative) and not an identity. 37 The ordered semigroup is positively ordered if each x 2 X is weakly positive, and Archimedean if for all strictly positive (strictly negative) elements x; y there is an integer n 1 such that x n y (x n y).
Lemma 9 (Hölder 1901; in part Huntington 1902 ) Every Archimedean cancellative semi-divisible positively ordered semigroup without identity can be embedded into ((0; 1); ; +).
Before I can apply this result, a number of lemmas must be shown.
Lemma 10 Assume A and AC. 38 For every state s, (a) the strength relation on E s is a weak order; (b) the strength relation on C s is a weak order.
Proof. Assume A and AC. Let s 2 S.
(a) On E s , is obviously transitive ([e e 0 &e 0 e 00 ] ) e e 00 8e; e 0 ; e 00 2 E s ). To show completeness, consider e; e 0 2 E s and suppose e 6 e 0 . Then there is an c 2 C such that cje is not weakly between s and cje 0 . We have c 6 = s: otherwise cje = cje 0 = s (as e and e 0 attract to s). W.l.o.g. suppose c > s (the proof is analogous if c < s). Then, by A and as e and e 0 attract to s, cje > s and cje 0 > s. Hence, as cje = 2 [s; cje 0 ], we have cje > cje 0 > s. So cje 0 is strictly between s and cje. Hence, by AC 1 , for every constitution c 0 not of state s, c 0 je 0 is strictly between s and c 0 je. So for every constitution c 0 (whether or not of state s) c 0 je 0 is weakly between s and c 0 je. That is, e 0 e, as desired.
is again obviously transitive. The proof that is complete is analogous to the completeness proof in (a), with the roles of constitutions and experiences inverted and using AC 2 instead of AC 1 .
Lemma 11 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . 39 For every state s, (a) the strength relation on E s is a linear order; (b) the strength relation on C s is a linear order.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 and let s 2 S. By Lemma 10, only antisymmetry remains to be shown in each part. This is done as follows.
(a) Consider e; e 0 2 E s with e e 0 ; we show that e = e 0 . By Lemma 8 it su¢ ces to show thatêe =êe 0 for allê 2 E. So consider anyê 2 E. Letting c w be a weak constitution (it exists by R 2 ), and putting c := c w jê, it follows from e e 0 that cje is weakly between s and cje 0 , and from e 0 e that cje 0 is weakly between s and cje. So cje 0 = cje 0 , i.e. c w jêje 0 = c w jêje 0 . By R 1 c w jêe 0 = c w jêe 0 , and so by c w 's weaknessêe 0 =êe 0 , as desired.
(b) Consider c; c 0 2 C s such that c c 0 . Then, for all e 2 E attracting to s 0 , we have from c c 0 that c 0 je is weakly between s 0 and cje, and from c 0 c that cje is weakly between s 0 and c 0 je. So cje = c 0 je for all e 2 E, i.e. c = c 0 by Lemma 5.
Note the large remaining mathematical gap between the linearity of (E s ; ) (shown in Lemma 11) and the embeddability of (E s ; ; ) into ((0; 1); ; +) (claimed in Theorem 3). This gap is large not only because of the role of composition but also because many linearly ordered sets (such as sets of higher cardinality than R, the lexicographically ordered set R 2 and many well-ordered sets) are not embeddable into the reals. More work is needed to close this gap.
Lemma 12 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . For all states s and all experiences e; e 0 2 E s , e > e 0 if and only if, for some experienceê, eê is strictly between s and e 0ê .
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 , and let s 2 S and e; e 0 2 E s . Let c w be a weak constitution (there is one by R 2 ). First, assume there isê 2 E such that eê is strictly between s and e 0ê . Then c w jeê is strictly between s and c w je 0ê . Hence, cje is strictly between s and cje 0 , where c := c w jê. So e > e 0 by Lemma 11. Second, assume e > e 0 . Then there is a c 2 C such that (*) cje 0 > cje s or cje 0 < cje s. c is obviously non-weak, so that by Lemma 7 we have c = c w jê for some experienceê. As cje = c w jêe = eê and cje 0 = c w jêe 0 = e 0ê , (*) implies that e 0ê > eê s or e 0ê < eê s. In these inequalities, I can replace by > and by <, by Lemma 6.
Lemma 13 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . 40 The assignment e 7 ! c w je, where c w is a …xed weak constitution, does not depend on the choice of c w and de…nes a bijection from E to fc 2 C : c is not weakg and for each state s an (order-)isomorphism between (E s ; ) and (fc 2 C s : c is not weakg; ).
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . Let c w be any weak constitution. First, the assignment does not depend on the choice of c w , because if c 0 w is another weak constitution and e 2 E then c w je = c 0 w je by an argument in the proof of Lemma 7. Regarding the …rst bullet point, surjectivity follows from Lemma 7. To show injectivity, consider distinct e 1 ; e 2 2 E. By Lemma 8 there is an experience e such that ee 1 6 = ee 2 , hence by Theorem 1 e 1 e 6 = e 2 e. So, by the weakness of c w , c w je 1 e 6 = c w je 2 e. Hence, c w je 1 e 6 = c w je 2 e, and so c w je 1 je 6 = c w je 2 je, which implies c w je 1 6 = c w je 2 .
Regarding the second bullet point, let us restrict the bijection to E s (for some s). The restriction is obviously a bijection onto fc 2 C s : c is not weakg. To see that it even is an order-isomorphism, consider any e + ; e 2 E s . By Lemma 11, it su¢ ces to show that e + > e ) c w je + > c w je . Assume e + > e . Then by Lemma 12 there is an experience e such that e + e is strictly between s and e e. So, c w je + je is strictly between s and c w je je, implying c w je + > c w je by Lemma 11.
Lemma 14 Assume A, I, AC, R 1,2 . For each state s, (E s ; ; ) is an Archimedean positively ordered semigroup. Proof. Let s 2 S. By Lemma 2, indeed de…nes an operation on E s . Claim 1. (E s ; ; ) is an ordered semigroup. Given Lemmas 1 and 11, is associative and linear. It remains to show stability of under . Let e; _ e; e 0 2 E s with e _ e. I show ee 0 _ ee 0 (which by Theorem 2 also implies e 0 e e 0 _ e). Assume for a contradiction that _ ee 0 > ee 0 . By Lemma 12 there is anê 2 E such that _ ee 0ê is strictly between s and ee 0ê . This implies, again by Lemma 12, that _ e > e. Contradiction. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. (E s ; ; ) is positively ordered. Assume for a contradiction that e 2 E s is strictly negative, i.e. e 0 > ee 0 = e 0 e for an e 0 2 E s . Then by Lemma 12 there is anê 2 E such that e 0ê is strictly between ee 0ê and s = e, a contradiction by Lemma 2. Q.e.d.
Claim 3. (E s ; ; ) is Archimedean. Let e; _ e 2 E s be strictly positive. I have to …nd an integer n 1 such that e n _ e. If e _ e, take n = 1. Now suppose _ e > e. Then by Lemma 12 there is anê 2 E such that _ eê is strictly between s and eê. By Lemma 4, e nê ! s as n ! 1, and so (using that _ eê 6 = s by Lemma 6) there is an n such that e nê is strictly between s and _ eê. So, by Lemma 12, e n > _ e.
Lemma 15 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . For all experiences e; e 0 ; _ e, if e _ e = e 0 _ e then e = e 0 (i.e. is cancellative).
Proof. Consider experiences e; e 0 ; _ e such that e _ e = e 0 _ e.
Case 1 : _ e 6 = e. For all n 1 we have e n _ e = e 0n _ e because e n _ e = e n 1 e 0 _ e = e 0 e n 1 _ e = e 0 e n 2 e 0 _ e = e 02 e n 2 _ e = ::: = e 0n _ e.
The state e n _ e = e 0n _ e converges to e and also to e 0 by Lemma 4. This already gives us e = e 0 . Now, let c w be a weak constitution, and consider the constitutions c := c w je and c 0 := c w je 0 . Note that c = c 0 , and that _ e is equally attracted by c as by c 0 , i.e. cj _ e = c 0 j _ e (= e _ e), where this state di¤ers from _ e by Lemma 6. So c c 0 by AC, and hence c = c 0 by Lemma 11. So, by Lemma 13. e = e 0 . Q.e.d.
Case 2 : _ e = e. First assume all experiences attract to e. Then, by Lemma 8, there exists a single experience; hence, e = e 0 , as desired. Now assume there is an experience • e attracting to • e 6 = e. Consider the experiencesẽ := • ee
, where e 6 = e (by Lemma 6), i.e. _ e 6 = e. So, by Case 1 above,ẽ =ẽ 0 , i.e.
• ee = • ee 0 . Noting that e• e = e 0 • e (by Theorem 2) with • e 6 = e, I can again apply Case 1 to infer e = e 0 .
Lemma 16 Assume A, I and R 1,2 , and let the model be not trivial. Then (E; ) contains no idempotent, i.e. no e with e 2 = e. In particular, each (E s ; ) (s 2 S) contains no idempotent, hence no identity.
Proof. Assume A, I, R 1,2 and non-triviality. Let e 2 E. Claim 1. There is an e 0 2 E such that e 0 6 = e. Suppose the contrary. By Lemma 8, E = feg. Hence, by non-triviality, there is a c 2 C such that (*) cje 6 = e. So c is non-weak, hence by Lemma 13 of the form c = c w je c for some weak c w 2 C and some e c 2 E. As E = feg, e c = e, whence c = c w je = e. So cje = e, contradicting (*). Q.e.d.
Let e 0 be as in Claim 1. Applying Lemma 6 twice, we have e 0 e 6 = e, and hence e 0 e 2 6 = e 0 e. So e 2 6 = e.
While all but one of Hölder's hypotheses have been shown to hold for our ordered semigroup (E s ; ; ) (s 2 S), Hölder's semi-divisibility hypothesis need not hold. 41 So Hölder's Theorem cannot be applied directly. To overcome this obstacle, the proof of Theorem 3 will …rst embed (E s ; ; ) into a larger ordered semigroup, to which Hölder's Theorem can be applied. More precisely, (E s ; ; ) is embedded into the positive part of its ordered group extension, drawing on another fundamental algebraic result:
Lemma 17 (Tamari 1949 , Alimov 1950 , Nakada 1951 For every commutative cancellative ordered semigroup (X; ; ), there exists an, up to isomorphism unique, smallest commutative ordered group into which (X; ; ) can be embedded; it is denoted (X; ; ) and called the ordered group extension of (X; ; ); X X + (:= fx 2X : x is strictly positiveg) if (X; ; ) is positively ordered without identity; (X; ; ) (hence (X + ; ; )) is Archimedean if (X; ; ) is Archimedean and positively ordered and contains no anomalous pair, i.e. no x; y with x > y and x n < y n+1 for all integers n 1.
For instance, the ordered group extension of X = f1; 2; :::g (with ; + standardly de…ned) isX = f0; 1; 2; :::g (with ; + standardly de…ned). To apply the Tamari-Alimov-Nakada Theorem, a single property must still be shown:
Lemma 18 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . For each state s, (E s ; ; ) contains no anomalous pair.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 . Let s 2 S and e; _ e 2 E s such that e > _ e. By Lemma 12 there is anê 2 E such that eê is strictly between s and e 0ê . So, since (eê) nê ! eê as n ! 1 (by Lemma 4), there is an n such that (eê) nê is strictly between s and e 0ê . In other words, e nên+1 is strictly between s and e 0n+1ên+1 . So, by Lemma 12, e n > e 0n+1 .
We can now …nally prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2 : Suppose the model is not trivial, and let s 2 S. By Lemmas 14, 15, 16, 18 and Theorem 2, I may apply the Tamari-Alimov-Nakada Theorem (Lemma 17) to embed the ordered semigroup (E s ; ; ) into (Ê + s ; ; ), an Archimedean ordered semigroup. As (Ê + s ; ; ) is moreover semi-divisible, without identity, cancellative and positively ordered (all this by being the strictly positive part of an ordered group), it can itself be embedded into ((0; 1); ; +) by Hölder's Theorem (Lemma 9). So (E s ; ; ) can be embedded into ((0; 1); ; +). Hence (E s ; ; ) (X s ; ; +) for some set X s (0; 1) closed under addition.
To show the second bullet point, write C s := fc 2 C s : c is not weekg. By Lemma 13, (C s ; ) (E s ; ). So, by the …rst bullet point (C s ; ) (X s ; ). We are done if C s = C s , i.e. if C s contains no weak constitution. Now suppose it contains one, c w ; then it contains no other one by Lemma 5, and all c 2 C s satisfy c > c w by de…nition of (non-)weakness. So, (C s ; ) = (C s [ fc w g; ) (X s [ f0g; ).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of the last theorem draws on the following fundamental result of topological algebra due to Arzél (1948) and Tamari (1949) . Recall that an ordered semigroup (X; ; ) is topological if its operation is continuous with respect to the order topology on X induced by . The notions of 'density'and 'completeness' are to be understood order-theoretically rather than topologically. 42 Lemma 19 (Arzél 1948 , Tamari 1949 ) Every cancellative, dense and complete topological ordered semigroup (X; ; ) with #X > 1 is isomorphic to (S; ; +) for some set S 2 fR; [0; 1); (0; 1); [1; 1); (1; 1)g or to the dual (S; ; +) thereof.
To apply this result to the structure (E s ; ; ) (s 2 S), I now …rst prove that all premises are satis…ed.
Lemma 20 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,5 . For every state s, on E s is complete.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,5 . Let s 2 S. In the de…nition of completeness, the part on suprema is equivalent to that on in…ma; so it su¢ ces to show the latter. The claim is obvious if the model is trivial. Now assume it is nontrivial. Let A E s be a non-empty set that is bounded below, say by e < 2 E s . I show that A has an in…mum in (E s ; ). As (E s ; ) is by Theorem 3 isomorphic to (X; ) for some set X (0; 1), there exists a strictly decreasing sequence (e k ) k=1;2;::: in A such that for all e 2 A we have e e k for some (su¢ ciently high) k. It su¢ ces to show that fe k : k = 1; 2; :::g has an in…mum (as this in…mum is then also one of A). Claim 1. There is a c 2 C s such that, for all e 2 E, e k e converges monotonically to c je as k ! 1. For all e 2 E, e k e converges (in R): if e = s obviously, if e > s because e k e is increasing and bounded above by e, and if e < s because e k e is increasing and bounded below by e. So the sequence of state paths corresponding to the sequence of constitutions (c w je k ) k=1;2;::: , i.e. the sequence of state paths whose k's component is (c w je k je 1 je n ) (e 1 ;:::;en)2[ 1 n=0 E n = (e k e 1 e n ) (e 1 ;:::;en)2[ 1 n=0 E n , converges pointwise. By R 5 , the limiting state path is the state path of some c 2 C. Taking n = 0 yields e k ! c , i.e. s ! c , so that c 2 C s . Taking n = 1 yields, for all e 2 E, e k e ! c je. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. c = c w je for some e 2 E s . As the model is not trivial, there is (by an earlier argument) an experience e not of type s. Suppose e > s (the proof is analogous if e < s. As e k e < for all k, e k e e < e for all k. So (by Claim 1) c je e < e. Hence, c je < e. So c je 6 = e. Hence c is not weak. Hence, by Lemma 13, c = c w je for some e 2 E s . Q.e.d.
Claim 3. e is the in…mum of fe k : k = 1; 2; :::g (hence of A, completing the proof ). First, e is a lower bound: each e k is at least as strong as e because, for each e 2 E, ee k is (by Claim 1) weakly between s and c je, i.e. (by Claim 2) weakly between s and e e. Second, consider another lower bound e , and suppose for a contradiction that e > e . Then, by Lemma 12, there is an e 2 E with e e strictly between s and e e. So there is (by Claims 1-2) a k with e e strictly between s and e k e. This violates e k e .
Lemma 21 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . For every experience e and state s with E s 6 = ;, inf e 0 2Es jee 0 ej = 0.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 and let e 2 E, s 2 S with E s 6 = ;. If e 2 E s then obviously inf e 0 2Es jee 0 ej = 0. Now suppose e 6 2 E s ; w.l.o.g. let e < s (the proof being analogous if e > s). So I have to show that inf e 0 2Es (ee 0 e) = 0, i.e. that inf e 0 2Es ee 0 = e. Claim 1. There is a c 2 C such that inf e 0 2Es ee 0 = c je. Consider a sequence (e k ) k=1;2;::: in E s such that ee k ! inf e 0 2Es ee 0 as k ! 1. Like in proof of Claim 1 of the proof of Lemma 20, one can show existence of a c 2 C s such that e k e converges to c je as k ! 1; hence inf e 0 2Es ee 0 = c je. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. c is weak (hence by Claim 1 inf e 0 2Es ee 0 = e, as desired.) Suppose the contrary. Then, by Lemma 13, there is an e 2 E s such that c = c w je (where c w is a weak state). We have inf e 0 2Es ee 0 = c je = ee . So e 0 e for all e 0 2 E s , i.e. e weakest among all experiences in E s . Hence, by Lemma 13, c w je is weakest among all non-weak constitutions in C s , a violation of R 4 .
Lemma 22 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . For every state s, if e 2 E s then e ê 2 for someê 2 E s .
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . Let s 2 S and e 2 E s . By R 5 the model is not trivial; hence there exists anẽ 2 E withẽ 6 2 E s ; w.l.o.g. letẽ < s (the proof is analogous ifẽ > 0). Let :=ẽe ẽ (> 0). By > 0 and Lemma 21, there is an e 0 2 E s such thatẽe 0 ẽ =2; again by Lemma 21, there is an e 00 2 E s such thatẽe 0 e 00 ẽe 0 =2. It follows that (ẽe 0 ẽ) + (ẽe 0 e 00 ẽe 0 ) =2 + =2, i.e. ee 0 e 00 ẽ . So, lettingê be the weakest of e 0 and e 00 ,ẽê 2 ẽ , i.e.ẽê 2 ẽ ẽe ẽ. Soê 2 e.
Lemma 23 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . For every state s, on E s is dense.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . Let s 2 S. If E s = ; the claim holds vacuously. Now suppose E s 6 = ;. Let X s (0; 1) be as in Theorem 3; hence (E s ; ; ) (X s ; ; +). Claim 1. inf X s = 0 (where this in…mum is formed in (R; ), hence exists but needn't belong to X s ). By Lemma 22 there exists a sequence (e k ) k=1;2;::: in E s such that, for all k, e 2 k+1 e k . So, by (E s ; ; ) (X s ; ; +), there exists a corresponding sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in X s such that, for all k, 2x k+1 x k , i.e. x k+1 x k =2. In particular, x k ! 0 as k ! 1. Hence inf X s = 0. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. (X s ; ) is dense (hence (E s ; ) is, completing the proof ). Let x; y 2 X s such that x < y. By Claim 1, X s contains a z < y x. Clearly, some multiple nz of z (n 2 f1; 2; :::g) is strictly between x and y.
Lemma 24 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . For every state s, (E s ; ; ) is a topological ordered semigroup.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 , and let s 2 S. If the model is trivial, the claim is obvious because E s is empty or singleton. Now assume non-triviality. By Theorem 3's isomorphism, it su¢ ces to show the claim for the structure (X; ; +), where X := X x (0; 1) is as in Theorem 3. The case X = ; is trivial. Now suppose X 6 = ;. Claim 1. X is topologically dense in (0; 1). Analogously to Claim 1 in Lemma 23's proof, inf X = 0. This and X's closedness under addition imply the claim. Q.e.d.
Claim 2. The 'intervals' fz 2 X : x < z < yg, x; y 2 X, form a basis of the order topology. By de…nition, every open set is a union of 'intervals'of type (i) fz 2 X : x < z < yg or (ii) fz 2 X : x < zg or (iii) fz 2 X : z < yg. Intervals of type (ii) or (iii) are writable as the union of intervals of type (i): fz 2 X : x < zg = [ z2X fz 2 X : y < x < zg because X has no smallest element (otherwise fc 2 C s : c is not weakg would by Lemma 13 have a smallest element, violating R 4 ); and fz 2 X : z < yg = [ z2X fz 2 X : y < x < zg because X has no largest element (as it is closed under addition).
So the intervals of type (i) alone form a basis. Q.e.d.
Claim 3. For all x; y 2 X the inverse + 1 (fz 2 X : x < z < yg) is open in X 2 (which by Claim 2 proves continuity of + : X 2 ! X, as desired). Let x; y 2 X. It su¢ ces to show that each (a; b) 2 A := + 1 (fz 2 X : x < z < yg) has an open environment A 0 A. Let (a; b) 2 A. So x < a + b < y. Hence := minfj(a + b) xj; j(a + b) yjg > 0. By Claim 1, there exist a ; a ; b ; b 2 X such that a =2 a < a < a a + =2 and b =2 b < b < b b + =2. The set A 0 := fz 2 X : a < z < a g fz 2 X : b < z < b g contains (a; b), is open in X 2 , and is contained in A because all (a 0 ; b 0 ) 2 A 0 satisfy x < a 0 + b 0 < y by j(a + b) (a 0 + b 0 )j < .
Lemma 25 Assume A, R 1,2 . The model is non-trivial if and only if #E 2.
under the isomorphism of multiplying by a in (0; 1). 43 So, the known rules '(a + b)x = ax + bx'(distributivity) and 'b(ax) = (ba)x'(associativity) in (0; 1) imply by isomorphism the corresponding rules 'e a+b = e a e b 'and '(e a ) b = e ab 'in E s . The next lemma contains these two rules and a third (non-obvious) one.
Lemma 27 Assume A, I, AC, R 1,2,4,5 . For all experiences e; _ e and all reals a; b > 0, we have e a e b = e a+b , (e a ) b = e ab and (e _ e) a = e a _ e a .
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . If #E 1 the claims hold trivially. Now assume #E > 1. Then the model is non-trivial by Lemma 25, so that the representation of Lemma 26 applies. As mentioned, it remains only to show the third rule '(e _ e) a = e a _ e a '. Let e; _ e 2 E and a > 0.
1. First suppose a is rational, say a = m n for m; n 2 f1; 2; :::g. Then (e _ e) a = e a _ e a because, repeatedly using the rule '(e a ) b = e ab 'and commutativity, we have
2. Now let a be arbitrary. Let s := e _ e and let M be the set of all (m; n) 2 f1; 2; :::g 2 such that m n a. I have to show that e a _ e a = sup (m;n)2M (e _ e) m n , which follows from the following three claims. Claim 1. e a _ e a 2 E s , i.e. e a _ e a = s. It su¢ ces to show that je a _ e a sj for all > 0. Let > 0. W.l.o.g. suppose e _ e (the proof is similar else). Then (*) e e _ e _ e. Let r be a rational with 0 < r < a. By (e _ e) r = s and Lemma 21 there is a > 0 such that for all b 2 (0; ) we have j(e _ e) r e b sj and j(e _ e) r _ e b sj , and hence (e _ e) r e b s and (e _ e) r _ e b s . So, as by (*) (e _ e) r e b (e _ e) r e b _ e b (e _ e) r _ e b , we have (e _ e) r e b _ e b s and (e _ e) r e b _ e b s , i.e. j(e _ e) r e b _ e b sj , still for all b 2 (0; ). Now take any rational r 0 > r such that a r 0 a and choose b = a r 0 . Note that e a _ e a = e r 0 r+r+b _ e r 0 r+r+b = e r 0 r _ e r 0 r e r _ e r e b _ e b = (e _ e) r 0 r (e _ e) r e b _ e b , where the last equality holds by part 1. So je a _ e a sj = j(e _ e) r 0 r (e _ e) r e b _ e b sj j(e _ e) r e b _ e b sj . Q.e.d. m n , where the second equality uses part 1. Q.e.d. Claim 3. Noẽ 2 E s withẽ < e a _ e a satis…esẽ (e _ e) m n for all (m; n) 2 M. Consider anyẽ 2 E s withẽ < e a _ e a . Then, as (E s ; ; ) = ((0; 1); ; +), for su¢ ciently small r > 0 we haveẽ(e _ e) r < e a _ e a ; hence for su¢ ciently small rational r > 0 we have (by part 1)ẽe r _ e r < e a _ e a = e a r _ e a r e r _ e r , which (by cancellation) impliesẽ < e a r _ e a r . Take any (m; n) 2 M with m n > a r. Thenẽ < e a r _ e a r < e a r _ e a r e m n Lemma 28 Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 . For all experiences e 0 ; e 1 with e 0 < e 1 , the assignment a 7 ! e 0 e a 1 de…nes an increasing bijection from (0; 1) to (e 0 ; e 1 ). In particular, fe : e 2 Eg ( S) is an interval.
Proof. Assume A, I, AC and R 1,2,4,5 , let e 0 ; e 1 2 E with e 0 < e 1 , and let f : (0; 1) ! R; a 7 ! e 0 e a 1 . Claims 1 and 3 below establish the result. Claim 1. f is strictly increasing. For all 0 < a < b, f (b) = e 0 e b 1 = e 0 e a 1 e b a 1 > e 0 e a 1 = f (a), where the inequality holds by e b a 1 > e 0 e a 1 . Q.e.d. Claim 2. lim a!1 f (a) = e 1 and lim a!0 f (a) = e 0 . By Lemma 4, f (n) = e 0 e n 1 ! e 1 as the natural number n tends to 1. So (using Claim 1) f (a) ! e 1 as a ! 1. By a similar argument, e b 0 e 1 ! e 0 as b ! 1. So, as by Lemma 27 e b 0 e 1 = (e b 0 e 1 ) 1=b = e 0 e Claim 3. f ((0; 1)) = (e 0 ; e 1 ). Let s 2 (e 0 ; e 1 ). I show that f (a ) = s for some a 2 (0; 1). We have sup f 1 ((e 0 ; s]) = inf f 1 ([s; e 1 )), by Claim 1 and f 1 ((e 0 ; s]) [ f 1 ([s; e 1 )) = (0; 1). Let a := sup f 1 ((e 0 ; s]) = inf f 1 ([s; e 1 )) (2 [0; 1]). Note that a 6 2 f0; 1g, because otherwise f 1 ((e 0 ; s]) = ; or f 1 ([s; e 1 )) = ;, violating Claim 2. So a 2 (0; 1). The proof is completed by showing that f (a ) = s.
I …rst show f (a )
s. For all n 2 f1; 2; :::g, by Lemma 27 f ( ) ! e 0 e a 1 = f (a ) as n ! 1 by Lemma 4. As for all n, f ( na n+1 ) < s (by na n+1 < a = inf f 1 ([s; 1))), in the limit f (a ) s.
I …nally show f (a )
s. For all n 2 f1; 2; :::g, by Lemma 27 f ( (n+1)a n ) = e 0 e (n+1)a =n 1 = e n 0 e (n+1)a 1 = e a 1 (e 0 e a 1 ) n . So f ( (n+1)a n ) ! e 0 e a 1 = f (a ) as n ! 1 by Lemma 4. For all n : f ( (n+1)a n ) > s (by (n+1)a n > a = sup f 1 ((0; s])), whence in the limit f (a ) s.
Lemma 29 Assume R 1,3 . We have fe : e 2 Eg = S.
Proof. Assume R 1,3 . Clearly, fe : e 2 Eg S. Now let s 2 S. Choose any c 2 C s . By R 3 there is an e 2 E such that cje = s, and by R 1 it follows that e = s.
Drawing on these lemmas, we can attack the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. First, the linear model for a state set S obviously satis…es all of properties A, I, AC and R 1-5 ; and so do its isomorphic variants, because reparameterisations preserve these properties (in the case of I because an increasing bijection between two state sets is automatically continuous).
Second, I consider a change model (S; E; C; ( :); (:j:)) satisfying A, I, AC and R 1-5 , and show that it is a reparametrisation of the linear model, to be denoted state space [a; b] S (a 6 = b) containing e and e 0 . (One may take a = e and b = e 0 as long as e 6 = e 0 .) As can show, the sub-model M [a;b] inherits the three axioms from M, so that, by Theorem 1, ee 0 = e 0 e. 44 This proves Theorem 1*.
The derivation of Theorem 2* is analogous to that of Theorem 1*. 45 To prove Theorem 3*, assume M satis…es its conditions, and consider a state s 2 S. Choose a b 2 Snfsg. The sub-model M [s;b] again inherits all conditions imposed on M, so that Theorem 3 applies to it. Hence, there exists a set X s (0; 1) closed under addition such that (i) (E s ; ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ; +), and (ii) (C s ; ) is isomorphic to (X s ; ) if C s contains no weak constitution, and to (X s [ f0g; ) otherwise. Here, the relation , the operation , and the notion of 'weakness'are initially de…ned w.r.t. the sub-model M [s;t];t ; but one may show that they can equivalently be de…ned w.r.t. to the original model M. This proves Theorem 3*. 46 As for Theorem 4*, one easily checks that if M is isomorphic to the linear model, then all axioms hold. Now suppose the axioms hold. If n = 1, then Theorem 4 applies directly, i.e. M is the linear model up to isomorphism. Now suppose n > 1. For any essentially one-dimensional (sub-) state space [a; b] S (a 6 = b), the sub-model M [a;b] again inherits all axioms from M, and hence is linear up to isomorphism by Theorem 4. It needs to be veri…ed that the isomorphisms for the various sub-models are 'compatible'in such a way that the full model M is also linear up to isomorphism. I here only de…ne the transformation through which M becomes linear, leaving it to the reader to verify that this transformation is indeed an isomorphism to the linear model. Call two experiences e; f 2 E equally strong if their composition ef is half way between e and f in terms of the state of attraction: ef = 1 2 e + 1 2 f . Fix an experience g 2 E; it will be used for normalization purposes and is said to have 'strength one'. For each state s 2 Snfgg, there is a unique experience in E s which is equally strong as g, and is thus also said to have 'strength one'; this follows from the linearity up to isomorphism of M [g;s] . Now de…ne the strength of a constitution c 2 C as the 2 (which is possible after assuming that #E > 1 -an unproblematic assumption since the theorem holds trivially if #E 1). Second, the sub-model may initially fail to inherit one axiom, namely R2 , since the sub-model may fail to contain a weak constitution. To enforce R2 , one should slightly amend the sub-model: arti…cally add an extra constitution and extend the revision rule such as to render this constitution weak. The same amendment must also be done to the sub-models considered in the proofs of Theorems 3* and 4*. 4 6 The given argument requires that we choose b from fe : e 2 Eg (which is always possible) and that Es 6 = ?. The case Es = ? is trivial since it su¢ ces to de…ne Xs as ?.
degree to which it is una¤ected by experiences h of strength one, i.e. as the ratio map each state s 2 S to the state of the linear model identical to s, map each constitution c 2 C to the constitution s x of the linear model given by s = c and x = (c), map each experience e 2 E to the experience s x of the linear model given by s = e and x = (e).
4 7 But it is essential that h has strength one, and that h 6 = c to ensure that cjh 6 = c. 4 8 It is essential that h has strength one, and that h 6 = e to ensure that eh 6 = e.
